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Policy-Oriented Legislation
In Accident Litigation
By JAmES R. RicHAmDSON*

A.

FORMULATION OF POLICY.

1. The Problem in General.
IT IS TO BE

doubted that organized society has ever devised

any political institution which can equal, or even rival, the distinct
potential in elected legislative bodies of securing to all members
of the group they represent at least some measure of desired
social, economic, political, ethical or esthetic satisfaction.
If this postulate be accepted as a statement of fact, it then
becomes evident that legislative bodies, as representative assemblies, have the basic qualities for providing the "good life",
by bringing to the largest number of the community the maximum
amount of comfort and security to be reasonably anticipated of
any governing body.
This assertion can generally be expected to not cause serious
disagreement due to the representative nature of the institutions
under discussion. (We make mention only of the argument that
states poor in economic goods and resources cannot afford the
luxury of a democratic government.) Nevertheless, despite this
known and admittedly democratic concept of representative assemblies, there are deficiencies in this method of enacting basic
legal sanctions which may be considered inherent and irremediable, or remediable through administrative changes. These matters will be explored in some detail as we proceed to investigate
certain mechanics of the legislative process in relation to policyoriented legislation.
* A.B., Eastern Kentucky State Teachers College; LL.B., University of Kentucky; Sturges Fellow, Yale Law School, 1954-1955. Formerly Assistant Attorney

Ceneral of Kentucky and member of law faculties of Stetson University and University of Florida. Member of Kentucky and Florida Bars. Address: Attorneyat-law, Citizens Bank Building, Lexington, Kentucky.
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Perhaps two of the most distinguishing characteristics of the
legislative process are slowness to act and cumbersomeness in
action. The latter named characteristic can clearly be traced to
the unwieldy size of many legislative bodies and also to complex
procedural rules. The criticism of slowness to act, as will be
pointed out more fully, stems from failure of legislative bodies to
orient themselves to a sound policy of planning and evaluating
legislation.
With further reference to the effectiveness of legislative assemblies, it is not to be denied that they are known to enact laws
that should not have been enacted and often fail to enact laws
that should become part of the community's legislative policy.
This means that any given politically organized group may be
subjected to the positive evils of over-legislation as well as legislative errors of omission from time to time.
An idealistically minded legislature may strive conscientiously
for the "good life" for all members of the community but the
Utopian state has never been reached. Possibly this failure of
achievement is as much due to defects in society itself as to defects in the system as a governmental unit.
Collectively, legislative processes fall short of perfection as a
result of certain elements which contribute to the fundamental
problems of legislating. These may be enumerated as:
1. Formulation of the written law which concerns itself
with the means and ends of policy determination.
2. Validation of the written law which involves legislative
organization and procedures.
3. Application of the written law which includes operational procedures and legal concepts of judicial and administrative
agencies.
The foregoing named elements are constant in that they are
always present. They are rendered inconstant as to goals sought
to be realized through certain factors engendered by the human
element, which contribute to make the named basic problems
more complex. They are:
1. Conflicting interests of legislators.
2. Conflicting interests of individuals and of society as
represented by pressure groups.
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3. Insufficient enlightenment of legislative bodies through
faulty or non-existent fact-finding techniques.
4. Difficulties of exact, clear and unambiguous expression
in the written law.
5. The necessity of interpretation and application of the
law by separate and distinct governmental agencies, possibly
with adverse philosophical thought.
6. Failure to eliminate the lag between enacted policy
laws and new societal needs and demands.
7. A natural staticism in statutory law that prevents anticipation of new and varying situations to which it will become applicable.
2. Observations on Legislative Objectives.
One concept of democratic government is that vital decisions.
affecting the whole of a society, or a substantial portion, can most
rationally be made when the decision-makers are intelligibly advised through hearing and weighing the expressed demands and
desires of representative elements of the governed. In theory, the
material needs and self-interests of society, collectively and individually, become realities through the medium of the legislative
acts of their elected representatives. These formal acts presumably reflect the objectives of the state; but the statement that
legislative policy is in theory synonymous with the demands and
expectations of the group that is represented is only substantially
correct in that it ignores the ultimate role of the judiciary in the
legislative process. The body of statutory law of a politically
organized unit may be said to represent public policy in attempting to achieve the desired goals of that unit. The realist, however, correctly views policy making as a working combination of
legislative act and judicial application.
The primary objective of a democratic state is to provide
through its institutions for the shaping and sharing of values in
the community at large, commensurate in an equitable degree
with the contributions of skill, energy, intelligence and moral
standards of the individual members to the general welfare.
These value concepts which are translated into material benefits
and spiritual well-being under an effective formulation of policy
will in turn differ in direct relation to the ethics, resources, political
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ideologies, scientific development and institutional practices of
the state in question.
In a very primitive society the existent demands and expectations of the individuals, and of the whole, were necessarily limited
to guarantees of personal security from physical violence and,
hence, the sole function of the governing unit was the preservation of peace and order. Security of the person must be assured
before other values become significant as man passes from elementary struggle for survival to economic struggle for position
and well-being.
With peace and order secured, the individual, and the community, through changing value perspectives, are enabled to consider the desirability of the security of acquisitions and the security of transactions. These new value perspectives become state
objectives in a democratically organized society.
A society creates new demands as it expands its boundaries
into and beyond new frontiers in the exploitation of great natural
resources. Legislatures are called upon to bridge the gap between
the law and social and economic institutions occasioned by advancements with which the legislative bodies, as organized, were
unable or unwilling to cope. These demands may take the form
of legislative grants of public lands to individuals or groups, antitrust laws or labor legislation to only suggest the possibilities of
new areas requiring legislative action.
As technological advances in communications and transportation further the development of a highly industralized state, with
consequent movements of population from rural to urban centers,
individual and group demands and expectations begin to transcend localized geographical, and even political, boundaries.
New, and theretofore unknown, state objective evolve out of a
society grown highly complex through its multiplicity of interactions.
With vanishing frontiers, and the consumption of known and
fixed resources, a nation-state enters a transitory period of making
the slow almost imperceptible retrogression from what is commonly known as the haves to the have-nots. This highly organized but unexpansive status of society becomes an index to individual demands. The individual desire assumes a new focus,
and the impelling motivation is to exchange the greater but con-
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tingent rewards of risk for the lesser but more tangible rewards
of comparative economic security.
Thus, social change and mild economic upheaval create new
demands on the part of society for services to be furnished by the
state. These new demands will be incorporated by the state as
part of the state's policy of government, if demanded by a representative group, else the outcome may be revolution, or ouster
by popular ballot under democratic institutions. Under the situation assumed, new state objectives arise and eventually find expression in the form of wide and comprehensive programming,
categorized as social legislation. It is the positive duty of representative legislative bodies to formulate policy in the light of the
best interests of constituent groups and formally enact that policy
through well-planned legislation, in the ever-shifting patterns of
society.
Not only do accepted concepts of state objectives undergo
processes of evolution, radical at times, to adequately reflect the
developmental processes of a society, but they invariably merge
and overlap, and at times even conflict. Thus we see guarantees
of the organic law subjected to reasonable restrictions, the liberty
of individuals restrained in deference to group interest, private
property held subject to the fiscal requirements of the state, and
the unregenerate bachelor taxed on his personal income to aid in
the support of public schools. The familiar phrase that "legislation is compromise" is clearly a demonstrable truism. Within this
framework of unceasing conflict and with social institutions unstable in time, policy-oriented legislation becomes indispensable
if legitimate state objectives are to be counterbalanced by efficiency in political institutions.

3. Achievement of State Objectives.
Valid state objectives, though clearly projected may be countered by impedimenta at the enactment or application stage as a
result of which formal policy may not be adopted, and if adopted
may be frustrated by doctrinal concepts of the judiciary. Not the
least of these impedimenta may be designated as:
a. Legislative inertia and self-interest.
It seems inevitable that legislators are activated chiefly by
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pressure. Perhaps it is an innate trait of personality that a point
of greatest pressure becomes motivation for reaction to that pressure. All formal legal sanctions are the result of certain stimuli.
It is a sound assumption that the stimuli which will cause positive
reaction in a numerically large legislative body must be greater
than those which will initiate action in administrative boards or
individual decision-makers.
Further, the legislative process, like other legal processes, is
in certain respects imbued with the immediate interests of all participating individuals. The legislator is highly conscious of reelection possibilities whenever it is his duty to act upon proposed
legislation which has the propensity for arousing conflict in public
opinion. The legislator is supremely aware of his constituents,
particularly in the fields of local expenditures and taxation. Many
a project, regardless of its true merit as a policy measure, looms
large in the mind of the legislator when it is primarily for the
benefit of the district he represents.
While enactments local in character get presurred through
under the reciprocity of log-rolling legislative techniques, basic
needed legislation in regard to a detail in the law of property or
domestic relations, for instance, lags through inattention due to
limited pressure. As a further example, legislation which has
outlived its usefulness, and perhaps has even become harmful,
may be permitted to remain in the statute books as the law of the
community, though it is no longer a proper and legitimate state
objective.
Legislative planning councils and permanent statutory revision commissions, adequately financed, are progressive steps toward planned and projected legislative programming which can
accomplish much in alleviating the ills of legislative inertia and
self-interest in the legislative process.
b. Unrealistic representation.
Another stumbling-block which acts as a positive deterrent
to the achievement of legitimate state objectives through intelligent and unselfish legislation comes in the form of unbalanced
and unrealistic representation in legislative bodies.
Politically organized districts along arbitrary geographical
lines is no longer a realistic method of securing representative
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government, particularly when those lines have not been examined and readjusted for possibly a decade or more. Increased
advances and progress in transportation and communication facilities mean that the social and economic interests of a group are
no longer confined within localized political boundaries.
Secondly, provisions for infrequent redistricting, the machinery for which may be controlled by the minority, create a
situation whereby shifts in population from rural to urban centers
go largely unnoticed or ignored by formal authority.
To illustrate, under the "county unit" system of Georgia or
the "town representative" method of Connecticut for apportioning
legislative representation a minority of the population can control legislation and dictate state wide policy. This possibility
means that legislation does not necessarily represent the demands
and expectations of a majority of the group.
In Connecticut ten per cent of the population situate in rural
areas commands a majority of votes in the State House of representatives. This unrepresentative situation comes about under a
procedure in which a town with less population than the number
of Representatives in the House has one Representative; and
towns of five thousand population have two Representatives, the
same and maximum number allotted to cities of two hundred
thousand or more population.
In the field of public education this small town control has
produced a condition whereby rural communities, under the
formula of state aid to public schools, get three times as much
money appropriation per pupil as is allotted to city schools. This
policy of subsidizing the public schools in such a meaningless
ratio exists without any showing of evidence that there is a larger
per capita cost in rural education.
The small-town control of legislative policy making has further led to rural areas having miles and miles of excellent, but
little travelled, highways throughout Connecticut, while city
streets and arterial highways crumble as a result of over-use and
under-appropriation. Such control presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to the enactment of policy that truly achieves
recognized objectives of the group as a whole. It is insurmountable in that relaxation and change of control can only be brought
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about through voluntary action on the part of that minority control group.
c. Pressure groups.
Lobbying can be a barrier to full achievement of state objectives. Lobbying, which is now an accepted adjunct to the
legislative process, may be defined in its broadest sense as the
efforts of individuals or groups to assert self-interest or publicinterest through seeking to influence the formal authoritative
actions of decision-makers. At such it is inherent in all types of
government and in all branches of government in varying degrees.
Legislative lobbyists may work toward the achievement of
ultimate goals which they consider, rightly or wrongly, to be in
the public interest generally. Again, they may frankly and openly
represent the economic interests of restricted groups sometimes
loosely described as "special interests". Neither is necessarily a
"good" or a "bad" lobby.
Lobbying which gives legislators or legislative committees
incorrect information or insufficient factual data on the matters
of policy being urged for adoption is correctly classified as a
"bad" lobby. A second type of lobbying which is necessarily
placed in the same category is action which has as its purpose
the corruption or coercion of legislators in their official capacities.
Fortunately, most of this latter type of lobbying, at least of the
open variety, has passed from the legislative scene. One state,
Florida, has demonstrated formal attitude toward such activity
by passage of a policy statute which removes entrapment as a
defense to bribery prosecutions of state officers and elected officials.
Lobbying brought out into the open through registration of
lobbyists can have a healthful effect on legislative programs and
constitute a real aid to the legislative function. Lobbying may
be educational to the legislative bodies and the public as well,
and in any event registration identifies the lobbyists and interests
represented.
The educational feature of modern lobbying comes about
through the focusing of the spotlight of public interest on the
legislative process. Interests represented by lobbyists may be
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great or small. Certainly the minority groups have a right to be
heard under democratic institutions, though their influence on
policy making has a direct relationship to the pressure they can
cause to be exerted on formal authority. However, the larger the
group attempting to influence the decision making process the
more reason there would seem to be for its existence as a general
rule.
d. The legislative committee system.
Legislative committees can be misused in such a manner as to
act as a preventive for the enactment of laws which truly and
accurately express state objectives in critical areas of formalized
action. This observation is an incongruity on its face as committee action has gained recognition as the very foundation of the
legislative process. Legislatures perform most of their functions
as a result of committee action. Committees are the essence of
the legislative fact-finding process. How thoroughly and efficiently committees function determine how well the parent organization is advised.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged advantages of the committee system, their actions can defeat their purposes. As an
example, legislative committees on claims, particularly at the
state level, can be used to bring out of committee claims of
friends and individuals of the right party affiliation, while letting
meritorious claims die in committee through failure to act.
Again, committee hearings may serve the primary purpose of
political sounding-boards for the legislature, whereby the members are influenced to act by reason of pressure rather than sound
policy. Or, the publicity attendant upon committee hearings may
be to further the aspirations and ambitions of the individual
members.
The foregoing suggest possible abuses of the committee system which react adversely on the legislative. The suggestions do
not indicate inherent defects in the system.
e. Judicial interpretation of legislative acts.
The judiciary in the interpretation of legislative enactments
may make an application which blocks or falls short of the sometimes fictional legislative intent. This statement gives emphasis
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to the fact that in the final analysis policy making depends upon
both the legislative and judicial processes for effective expression.
A legislative body, in theory at least, makes a determination
of sound policy measures after a careful and painstaking analysis
of all available data which has revealed all public and private
interests, conflicting and in harmony. It then proceeds to formally
enact this policy into law, seeking through the vehicle of exact
phraseology to aid in the interpretation of its policy expressions
by the courts.
When two branches of government must be coordinated to
execute legal sanctions through distinct and independent acts
differing in point of time and place it is perhaps not without
reason that certain practices and doctrines are fostered to bridge
the legislative-judicial gap between unbending statute and new
and different circumstances. Not infrequently though the procedure seems to be over-indulged.
Let us for a moment consider one of the most prolific fields of
accident litigation, and examine a statutory enactment for the
regulation of motor vehicle traffic, the replica of which can be
found in most of the states motor vehicle codes.
The standard statutory provision for yielding the right of way
at street intersections will appear in substance as follows:
Every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a
street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection, to any vehicle approaching from his right, except where otherwise directed by a traffic officer or by a
lawful traffic regulation, device or signal.
The above rule thus enunciated by the legislature as a part of
its policy in regard to the law of the road is clear and simple and
would seem to demand a rather arbitrary application in the event
of an intersectional collision by two motor vehicles. On the face
of the statute responsibility is fixed by the answer to the inquiry,
"Vho was approaching the intersection from the left?"
Such a conclusion is not substantiated, however, as is demonstrated by almost countless decisions in numerous jurisdictions.
The courts, in applying legislative policy to such accidents for the
purpose of determining liability, build up a complicated formula
wherein the speed of the vehicles, their relative distances from the
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intersection, visibility of each driver, the condition of the road
and all the surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration in ascertaining which driver should have yielded and
who was at fault. Basically, this reasoning may have the characteristics of good sound legal philosophy but it should not be
propounded to directly nullify legislative enactments.
In such accident litigation actionable negligence is the recognized criterion under which an aggrieved party is entitled to
recover. A legislature may as a matter of policy enact a statute
providing that contributory negligence is a complete defense. The
courts in activating this policy develop and apply their own legal
concepts. As a result a trial jury is given instructions and counter
instructions on "negligence", "contributory negligence", proximate cause", 'last clear chance", "sudden emergency", and "unavoidable accident", to mention a few doctrinal concepts that
find their way into most accident cases.
The layman or impartial observer; not advised in the premises,
might conceive that the law in regard to plain ordinary automobile accidents should be relatively simple and susceptible of clear
and concise restatement to a trial jury. But, during the approximately half a century of motor vehicular accident litigation the
law in action has become more complicated as the accident rate
increased and trial dockets become more crowded.
Numerous reversals on the law necessarily lead one to conclude that lawyers cannot write instructions on the law of the
road, that the trial courts do not know whether they are right or
wrong, and that only God, perhaps, could understand them.
Those persons familiar with the labor movement in the
United States will recall how labor unions in their infancy were
brought under the anti-trust provisions of the Sherman Act as
combinations in restraint of trade. They will further recall how
Congress thereupon enacted the Clayton Act, specifically providing that labor organizations should not be construed to be
combinations in restraint of trade; and how the courts circumvented this congressional declaration of policy by continuing to
hold as theretofore.
The superiority of government by law over government by
men, from an operational standpoint, is never clearer than when
the law thwarts the legitimate aims of its makers.
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The United States Court of Appeals has provided such an
example by ruling that the National Labor Relations Board cannot deprive a union of its services on the grounds that a union
official filed a false non-Communist oath and the union members
knew it was false.
Although it was obviously the intention of Congress to deny
the NLRB's services to Communist-led unions, it authorized the
board to act only if an oath was not filed. Punishment of union
officials filing false oaths was left to the jurisdiction of the criminal
courts.
Thus the distinction between the philosophies of government
is made. In a government of men, good intentions can be used to
justify any means. But, in a government of law, intentions good
or bad must bow before the letter of the law until it is changed
by the duly constituted legislative authority.
Thus does legislative policy at times, become ground into unrecognizable refinement in the mill of judicial interpretation.
f. Administrative weaknesses.
Other impediments to formulation of rational and timely legislative policy may be listed as:
1. Failure to interest qualified persons in serving as legislators.
2. Failure to provide skilled assistance to legislative bodies
on technical subjects to facilitate fact-finding techniques.
S. General public apathy toward legislative policy.
4. Too short and infrequent legislative sessions.
5. Formal legislative procedures which can be manipulated to block desirable legislation.
The majority of legislators are conscientious men, but totally
unoriented as to the state or national requirements through overall policy-directed legislation. They go into the various legislative assemblies, at biennial sessions, firmly resolved to represent
their individual districts, rather than a now cohesive state or
national unit, to the best of their individual abilities. Many are
retired or semi-retired employees, farmers or businessmen who
"don't want to miss the fun" at the capital for a sixty-day period,
and who have no personal obligations that will be too seriously
disrupted by a temporary absence. They are intelligent, capable
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and experienced in their own fields of endeavor, but generally
unfamiliar with legislative policy problems arising outside of
localized spheres of interest. Generally, it may be said that individuals qualified for legislative duty are of the type who are
immersed in other interests. Those public spirited enough to
render public service can rarely afford the financial sacrifice that
legislative terms entail. Only adequate pay or a stimulated sense
of public duty can attract qualified men to the various legislatures.
Many of the shortcomings discussed can be traced to methods
rather than men. In our legislative bodies there is urgent need
for staffs of non-elected, non-patronage full time technical advisers. Too many state legislative bodies at times depend solely
on personal information and lobbies to chart the legislative course.
Policy depends largely upon information gained through a sound
and thorough fact finding process. The public must become educated to accept the expense of appropriations for "studies" whereby adequately financed legislative councils can study and report
on proposed and pending legislation in successive legislative assemblies.
It is human nature for the average person to display a minimum of interest in any matter that apparently does not concern
personal interests and welfare directly. However, within a highly
developed and integrated society the majority of legislation is
charged with the general public interest. This observation is
particularly true with respect to increased social legislation.
With methods of modem communication making the widespread community a unity for many purposes, and with highly
publicized legislative hearings through various media it is to be
assumed that the public will become more sensitive to legislative
matters. Such interest combined with expression of views can be
expected to provide a rather efficient measuring rod for evaluating
existing legislative policy and for formulating future policy.
Legislative rules of procedure are necessary for the orderly
conduct of legislative business. In addition they are devised to
guarantee certain results. Of immediate concern is procedure
designed to insure an opportunity to the minority to be heard,
and checks and balances devised to prevent the enactment of
hasty or ill-considered legislation. Wherever possible the pro-
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cedural rules should be streamlined to expedite such meritorious
ends.

4. Nation-State Policy Determination.
Legislation is the dominant policy determining factor in a
democratic form of government. In practice this assertion may
be questionable. This is so for the reason that legislatures do not
necessarily effectuate policy though they do enact the statutes
which become binding legal sanctions.
To quote from a not too authoritative source in some respects:
Aaron Burr once stated:
Laws make lawyers; lawyers make laws; and it is a sinister
circle that is ever growing.
This statement may be regarded facetiously, but it serves to
emphasize a significant fact. Statutory law is fast replacing the
common law, the latter having even now been reduced to a
minimum in litigation before the United States Supreme Court.
In this transient stage from the common law to statutory law
it becomes increasingly important that legislatures strive for constructive policy-determining procedures and programs. And the
elements or forces that have much to do with the shaping of policy
are worthy of inquiry.
Enlightenment through past experiences reveals that power is
the predominating factor in the shaping of legislative policy.
Little or much power may be required to be expended in direct
proportion to the deprivations that may be anticipated to accrue
to one segment of society as opposed to the benefits sought by
the group seeking to influence the legislative process in its policy
formulation.
Should a group of interested sportsmen seek revision of the
game and fish laws in furtherance of a conservation project little
opposition outside the group itself can be expected. It will be
seen that legislation on game and fish presents a policy problem
that is state-wide in scope, but localized as to the group immediately affected. Benefits and deprivations are concurrent in
that they center upon and are largely confined to the movants.
Again, in the event that the legislature should, as a policy measure, move to enact a law which would remove contributory negli-
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gence as a defense to railroad companies in accident cases and
set up comparative negligence to govern recovery, it can reasonably be expected that the deprivation-benefit test would determine the alignment of opponents and proponents.
However, should the legislative body proceed to debate the
advisability of increasing state property taxes in the interest of
state aid to public schools there would then be an alignment of
personal interest groups with a marshalling of power in divided
camps on a much wider and more comprehensive scale. Parents,
teachers, parent-teacher associations and civic minded people
would oppose property owners and investors groups in a power
show down.
Legislation that threatens an overthrow of the established
order of business or societal institutions and practices will ordinarily erupt into social and economic conflict. Such problems
have confronted this country in the form of the slavery issue, economic depression, the labor movement, social legislation, national
defense and in the segregation cases.
Repercussions may be so violent and conflicting interests so
irreconcilable that legislation and civil government become inadequate to enforce compliance with legal sanctions. Policy then
becomes a matter to be determined by force in the arena of war
rather than in the legislative or judicial forum.
Seldom do policy measures lead to such extremity of action in
a democratic state but the hypothesis serves to illustrate that
group activity, as such, is not alone the moving force that brings
legislative policy into existence.
Group activity, where contrary to reigning policy concepts,
can be successfully ignored or resisted up to a point that has not
become crucial. In such case group activity which advocates
policy change may be ineffective until it becomes strong enough
to challenge the opposing group's position. Thereupon the social
and economic strife may become such a burden upon society
generally that legislative action is required to relieve society of
the burden.
Thus does the power process often shape governmental policy.
The foregoing is graphically illustrated by the labor movement in
America, which was successfully resisted in part until a new
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philosophy of the social order became current in government,
gaining impetus through the adversity of economic depression.
B.

APPLICATION OF POLICY.

1. General considerations.
It is for legislative bodies, as policy-making institutions to
determine the nature and the scope of governmental policy as
dictated by the demands and expectations of the society being
governed.
Policy may properly be considered as either general or special.
In an organized democratic society there is general policy upon
which everyone is agreed: Law should be just and impartially
applied; personal security and freedom must be assured; business
should be prosperous; churches and schools should be supported
in some manner.
These are some of the recognized, but everchanging, state
objectives we have mentioned which collectively represent state
policy. However, when it comes to putting these objectives into
force and effect, the policy questions involved will cause a wide
divergence of views.
One phase of policy determination for legislative consideration is in reference to when formal social defenses are necessary.
Legislatures in formulating an integrated policy, which conforms
to accepted standards of the people, are not only concerned with
the inquiries "when" and "how", but "what" as well.
It may well be that in some areas of human relations community disapproval of certain practices will be a sufficient deterrent to the end that no formal legal sanctions are necessary. But,
eventually community standards of conduct may rise above the
ethics of particular trades or professions and require additional
regulations by means of formal laws; as in strict building codes or
controls on the medical profession. Only planned legislative programs can provide solutions to current problems of this nature.
Further, legislative bodies have, as a part of their function,
the duty of determining how their established policies will be
enforced. There may be a necessity for criminal sanctions through
fine and imprisonment; there may be administrative sanctions
through licensing or publicity; or sanctions imposing civil lia-
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bility in contract or tort; and there may even be sanctions by
means of reward or subsidy for compliance. Policy formulation
it will be seen, then has indispensable features somewhat mechanical in nature.
2. Accident Litigation Chaos.
In attempting to analyze and project a policy-oriented approach to the formulation of a legislative program no other field
of law is more provocative of serious thought, nor more in need
of clarification of objectives than that of accident litigation.
In accident litigation capable trial attorneys find an everincreasing outlet for their talents. Statistics reveal that a majority
of accident litigation involves automobile accidents. Manufacturers place more and more higher powered cars on super highway systems. The accident rate climbs proportionately. The National Safety Council has reported through magazine and newspaper releases that in excess of thirty-six thousand persons were
killed in highway accidents in nineteen hundred and fifty-four.
This number is greater than the total number of American soldiers
killed in three years of fighting in Korea. The enumerated deaths
on the highways does not include, but reflects, the many more
thousands injured, many crippled and maimed for life as a result
of vehicular collisions and pedestrian-involved accidents.
Jury verdicts in accident cases are climbing to new heights
of recovery, presenting an economic problem, which gives cause
for concern, apart from the tremendous death toll which is now
apparently accepted reluctantly as a base cost of modern transportation.
Verdicts ranging between $250,000 and $800,000 for total and
permanent disability due to personal injury have become not uncommon. These verdicts may be compared with the average
verdict of from $15,000 to $30,000 not more than ten to fifteen
years ago for the same type of disability.
Accident litigation has brought much uncertainty to the law
where a reasonable degree of predictability is desired by the
participants. No individual can fully insure himself against accidents or liability for accidents under the present state of the
law; the contingency of which may solidify into catastrophic
proportions when the lightning of a highway accident strikes. An
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accident may mean serious economic loss through injury caused
by an irresponsible driver, or a verdict and judgment that wipes
out life's savings.
Contractural obligations involve voluntary associations wherein the adversary parties can meet in court, if necessary, on terms
of relative equality. Societal interest in such litigation is rather
restricted, for neither the situation of the parties nor the outcome
can generally be expected to result in a burden being imposed on
the community.
But, in accident litigation, which provides a major contact for
society and the law, the average individual is forced into litigation, and under different circumstances. Accident litigation entangles all types of persons, strangers before the involuntary association, who are called upon either to defend or prosecute a
civil action for damages with the outcome of vital economic concern to all parties.
It has been urged that abuses in personal injury cases have
caused criticism to be directed at courts and attorneys, and that
this is destined to increase with a lessening of public confidence
in judicial administration of such cases.
These abuses have led to ambulance chasing, the filing of
unjust claims, prospering insurance companies, false promises,
unpredictability in the law, and verdicts which bring a windfall
to the plaintiff, or disaster to the defendant, or the reverse, it is
further urged.
Should a broken limb be worth one-thousand dollars in a rural
area and evaluated at ten-thousand dollars by a jury in a metropolitan area?
Should a plaintiff who has access to a ranking trial specialist
be entitled, relatively speaking, to double or triple recovery?
Should an injured person be subjected to the laws of chance
in being struck by a corporate agent or by an irresponsible party?
Should the average defendant have his future mortgaged by
an unconscionably large verdict as a result of a temporary lapse
of reasonable care?
Is accident litigation one phase of tort law in which reasonable
predictability in the law is to be sacrificed for a legal gamble on
the big verdict?

LEGIS AnTION iN

AccDEN

LGATION

Can respect for the law be maintained under such state of
facts?
These and other erlevant inquiries make accident litigation a
problem for society, and hence, for the legislature.
3. Suggested Policy Study.
Societal relations which give rise to political instability, economic loss, social conflict, or health and safety hazards which
bear on established concepts of the general welfare create policy
problems which necessitate community intervention.
a. Preliminary survey.
Contemplated intervention must be accompanied with problem solving inquiries by the decision-makers in the initial stages.
Who will intervene?
The pertinent subject of inquiry is whether the problem requires action by the legislature, the judiciary, administrative
agencies, pressure groups or voluntary associations.
Perhaps associations such as national, state or local safety
councils through educational campaigns which engender fear and
create caution, or respect for human life can reduce the accident
toll and resultant economic loss. But, is this adequate? The
answer is that the failure of such campaigns are self-evident. At
best they are attempts at a preventive rather than a cure.
Administrative agencies can cause to be increased the patrolling of highways and the forfeiture of licenses and registration
for infractions of traffic regulations. However, if a deterrent is
effective to a degree it is only in the nature of incidental relief
and avoids a solution of the real problem.
Further inquiry must be made into the standards of cars and
legal doctrines created by the courts in interpreting statutes and
applying the common law in accident litigation. Their effectiveness or ineffectiveness can be determined with some accuracy in
reference to results. This will require a statistical survey of the
quantity of automobile accident litigation; relative amounts of
verdicts; compromised claims; satisfied and unsatisfied claims;
costs of jury trials in such cases; time expended by courts in trying; and the amounts of lawyers' fees.
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A study of available alternative procedures may lead to the
conclusion that the problem society faces is so critical due to
changed conditions and established practices that legislative intervention is necessary for the formulation of new policy.
Forwhat objectives?
If and when a policy of intervention by formal authority is
found to be desirable for the good of society a clarification of
goals is an essential of intelligent action. Certain inquiries must
be made and answered. What benefits will inure to the community through intervention? Is intervention for the purpose of
protecting the interests of individuals or organized groups? Is
intervention for the purpose of creating a new and greater respect
for bench and bar? Have the damages to person and property
from automobile accidents produced such a social problem as to
make it not only desirable but impelling that reparation of loss be
guaranteed, and that the economic loss be spread and shared by
the community?
By what methods?
Having clarified objectives the decision makers are policyoriented. With goal values clearly established they are in a position to determine the methods for formulation and enforcement
of policy measures.
With what effects?
The final analytical stage in the process of policy approach to
legislative action requires a post legislative study of legal sanctions to ascertain if legislative policy has been effected and if the
results attained are beneficial to society.
Many individuals within the legal profession itself have become convinced that, through persistent abuse, accident litigation
has become a malignant wen on the face of justice.
The increase in the amount of verdicts in personal injury
cases, coupled with the fact that this type of case encompasses
most of our jury trials, would seem to be some evidence of needed
relief on the part of defendants to such actions.
In personal injury cases tried by juries, it has been established
that jury trials are invariably requested by the plaintiff. The con-
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verse is true in actions on contract or open account to recover
money due. Juries are notoriously in sympathy with the underdog, and in tort actions we have the injured plaintiff as contrasted to the debtor defendant in money actions.
If the uncertainty of the amount to be recovered were not a
constant factor with the possibility of a liberal verdict in the
offing, there is reasonable certainty that a substantial percentage
of accident claims would be compromised without trial. Does
the fact that liability is admitted in many cases, with readily
ascertainable damages the only issue, indicate attempts to make
fortune out of misfortune through litigation before a trial jury as
opposed to compromise? If jury verdicts are excessive, are we to
censure the passion of laymen where it has been inflamed by
experts paid to ignite it?
Examination and study might disclose that the lawyer's contingent fee is detrimental to the ends of justice and tends to
promote litigation. This type of fee falls short of champerty and
maintenance by the fact that the attorney does not also pay the
costs of maintaining the action. It is defended on the ground that
otherwise many meritorious claims might be denied their day in
court through inability of the claimant to pay a lawyer. This is
doubtless true. It is equally true that many meritorious claims
are denied equal access to the courts under a specialized system
whereby experienced and successful attorneys for the plaintiff
are in a position to accept the most promising cases while refusing others of equal merit, but poor financial risks.
In England the contingent fee is not countenanced. As a result, with court costs notoriously high and a rather extensive legalaid program for the indigent, the middle-classes are prone to
observe, "I am neither rich enough nor poor enough to go to law."
The contingent fee in accident litigation poses a question of
propriety which merits thorough investigation by the decisionmakers before approval or condemnation.
The foregoing observations on jury verdicts in accident cases
have to an extent assumed that on the average they are becoming
excessive. It may well be that just as many or more personal injury claims are inadequately compensated. A procedure which
fosters either situation is vicious in results at least, if not inherently so.
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Another possibility is that a careful study may reveal that
verdicts in personal injury actions are not excessive. Proponents
of contingent fees and tort action specialists argue that jury
verdicts are only beginning to give just recognition to the realities of monetary devaluation and to capitalization of lost earning power through permanent disability.
In assessing the spread and absorption of economic loss and
benefit in personal injury cases there are further necessary inquiries of a preliminary nature.
First, there should be a relational study of accident litigation
verdicts in rural and urban areas. The information adduced can
be correllated with a study of type-cases considered over-compensated or under-compensated, and the percentage that go uncompensated; all in relation to the income brackets occupied by
the injured.
On this level of inquiry it is also material to ascertain the
percentage of recovery paid over to attorneys as contingent fees,
and by whom paid; individuals, associations, governmental
agencies, or corporations.
b. Policy-oriented approach.
The foregoing suggested areas of inquiry, which have been
labelled as preliminary in some respects, may largely be classified under the first step in a more elaborate break-down for legislative policy formulation of the decision-makers, as follows:
1. Intelligence: Intelligence logically constitutes the initial
process in a scientific method of approach to the solution of a
problem. With particular reference to policy orientation in the
legislative process, intelligence includes the securing of scientifically screened information on policy problems for the enlightenment of those who occupy the role of decision-makers.
2. Recommending: Recommenders are not necessarily
policy-makers and a separation of the two functions is a constructive movement toward unbiased decisions. However, the tvo
may occupy a dual role in the legislative process where committee
members are experts in the field of proposed legislation referred
to them. Recommenders are fact-finders who, with carefully
analyzed information as a basis, suggest to the decision-makers
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the adoption of certain policy, or perhaps, mention certain acceptable policy-alternatives.
8. Prescribing:Prescribing entails the enactment of statutes or ordinances, promulgation of administrative regulations, or
issuance of executive orders which enunciate the formal adoption
of policy by formal authority.
In the legislative process the finished product presupposes
thorough debate, the rejection of alternatives, final decision, and
the use of clear, exact expression as an adequate conveyance for
settled policy. Prescribing also requires the rather arbitrary compliance with rules of procedure as well as with mechanics of form,
including the final filing with the proper public repository.
4. Invoking: Has to do with setting in motion or activating
policy.
5. Applying: Concerns itself with the administration of or
enforcement of policy, and may not be sharply differentiated
from invocation of policy.
6. Appraising: Evaluation of the policy is an indispensable
phase of the legislative process if wisely and judiciously applied.
Relevant inquiry directs attention to studies to determine if the
policy as formulated and invoked has accomplished the projected
ends by the means provided. Appraisal reveals if the statutory
expression of policy has proven desirable as an acceptable and
enforceable legal sanction.
7. Terminating: Proper appraisal may disclose the need
for amendment; the necessity of repeal as ill-conceived; or may
suggest repeal for the reason that desired objectives have been
accomplished.
c. Alternatives suggested by policy study.
The intelligence function in policy formulation has been noted
above mainly in regard to results. These results may be illumined,
for a study of possible policy alternatives, by means of a cataloguing and detailed analysis of existing statutes and applicable
judicial doctrines which have been built up around them by the
The doctrines of res ipsa loquitur, attractive nuisance and
courts.
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manufacturers' liability suggest a relevant region of investigation
to determine what effect, if any, they have had on recovery, or
denial of recovery in accident litigation.
A further inquiry is suggested by the doctrine of contributory
negligence, which may be the controlling factor in any given
automobile collision or pedestrian involved accident. Does a
study of the flow of decisions indicate that contributory negligence
as a bar to recovery has worked substantial injustice and hardship in the cases to the detriment of the best interests of society.
Do the facts indicate that comparative negligence should be
adopted in accident litigation to the end that the burden of negligence be shared?
There may be existing statutes on traffic regulation as: "the
violation of a traffic regulation or ordinance is prima facie evidence of negligence", and another providing that an "automobile
guest can recover damages from his host in the event of accidental
injury only in the event that the latter was guilty of gross negligence amounting to willful and wanton misconduct". Such statutes, and others of a like nature are relevant policy measures
which may require reevaluation in the light of their influence on
the outcome of decisions.
The family purpose doctrine, a minority rule, in which the
owner of an automobile is liable for the injuries negligently inflicted by the members of his family in operating the vehicle is a
strong policy concept evolved by the courts. An exception to the
general rules of tort liability it is apparently derived from the
minority rule that holds motor vehicles to be dangerous instrumentalities.
A question might arise as to whether this rule should be
adopted as a policy measure. Perhaps in the light of National
Safety Council reports the recommenders may feel it realistic
policy to formally declare the motor vehicle a dangerous instrumentality, thus in effect extending the family purpose doctrine
to gratuitous bailees of the owner.
With definite and exhaustive information on existing laws and
doctrines and their impact on the decisions governing recovery
definite policy or policy alternatives may be recommended or
presented as open suggestions to the decision-makers.
In consideration of findings relative to alleged abuses in ac-
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cident litigation and voiced criticisms of practices prevailing in
this field of law, it is conceivable that policy recommendations
not confined to the laws and doctrines regulating the bare right
to recovery might be forthcoming.
Investigation of the statutes in states which fix a maximum
amount recoverable for wrongful death, along with the case decisions in point and all surrounding circumstances could lead to
the conclusion that this is a sound policy measure; or, the recommendation might go further and urge that ceiling recoveries be
extended to all types of personal injuries through means of a fixed
schedule.
A fixed schedule detailing the amounts recoverable for specified injuries, permanent and temporary, partial and total, would
be made all inclusive by spelling out the compensable items of
damages as lost earnings, loss of future earning power, costs of
treatment, disfigurement, and pain and suffering.
When such a program of policy is visualized a natural reaction
is whether or not it might be expedient to recommend the enactment of a comprehensive policy program which would make compulsory the carrying of liability insurance. Conformance to this
requirement would be a condition precedent to the grant of a
privilege to operate any motor vehicle over the public streets and
highways.
Having reasoned to this point on policy legislation, a further
step would undoubtedly be suggested to the legislative factfinders. Namely, should policy formulation be deemed complete
with recovery limited in amount, but also insured in proper cases,
or should a "direct action" statute be enacted authorizing an injured party to proceed directly against the insurer.
Such a statute contrasts radically with the general rule that
reference to insurance companies or adjusters in accident litigation is ground for declaring a mistrial. Surveys in two states,
Louisiana and Wisconsin, which have "direct action" statutes indicate that verdicts are not running measurably higher as a result
of insurance company defendants. There is no reason for "direct
action" statutes to increase litigation more than would compulsory
insurance alone, as that, if a fact, is known to juries. Under compulsory insurance plans "direct action" statutes bring the real
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parties in interest into court and should expedite settlements or
trials.
A suggested alternative to a "direct action" statute would be
a statute providing designated penalties if an insurance carrier
did not pay off on a liability policy within a specified number of
days after final judgment against the insured.
Under a policy of compulsory insurance, which eliminates the
selected risk type of insurance, it is inescapable that insurance
rates will be higher to guarantee a fair return to companies lest
they be driven from the field. This, of course, means that the risk
of loss is spread and a larger societal group bears its proportionate
share of economic loss. In addition injured claimants, who might
become a burden, are not opposed to irresponsible defendants.
In time, under compulsory insurance uninsurable risks will be
removed from the highways to the betterment of all interests concerned. Is such a program sound public policy in regard to accident litigation. The decision-makers can have the answer after
thorough study.
With respect to pedestrians, policy might dictate the adoption
of liability without fault in actions against motor vehicle operators
for personal injury or wrongful death. This is more than feasible
under the compulsory insurance plan, and there is precedent for
it under the common law rules of liability imposed on inn-keepers
and common carriers. In view of the relatively unequal status of
motorists and pedestrians on the streets and highways, it has
not as yet been seriously suggested that the latter be included in
a compulsory insurance program to protect motorists.
Yet another policy measure which might be suggested as an
alternative by investigation would be to take accident litigation
of the motor vehicular variety from under the jurisdiction of the
courts entirely at the trial stage level.
Under this suggested procedure, automobile insurance would
also be compulsory and payment of claims under a policy would
be conditioned upon an award by an administrative tribunal
functioning in a manner similar to the procedure employed by
Workmen's Compensation Boards.
It must be recognized in considering a policy of such a radical
departure from present procedure that the activity of lawyers
specializing in the trial of negligence cases would be greatly re-
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stricted and their principal source of income reduced or removed.
The foregoing observation serves to emphasize that any worthwhile study and acceptable formulation of policy in the field of
accident litigation must be undertaken with due regard to the
parties of primary interest,-the litigants, the courts, the legal profession, and the community.
d. Termination of policy measures.
Proceeding from the prescription stage in the legislative process, the policy makers are confronted with problems of invoking
and applying the legal sanctions adopted as public policy. Herein, as has been mentioned, policy is effectuated by activation.
The channels for this procedure are found in administration and
enforcement by the proper judicial officers or administrative
agencies.
Then the policy measures must be evaluated in action to determine if proposed objectives are being attained and if they
have proven beneficial to society.
Evaluation of policy may tie in with the final step in the legislative process. This is true when evaluation leads to a decision to
terminate.
Termination of policy when it has been found to have accomplished its purposes, or has proven inimical to community needs,
or contrary to community demands and expectations, is a matter
of policy in itself, which has at times been sadly neglected or
overlooked entirely in the legislative process.
Statutes have continued as formal expressions of the law
though outmoded, or their purpose completed, or no longer enforcible, or contrary to the mores of the community.
As a classic example, the ill-starred Volstead Act was an attempt to legislate unacceptable moral standards through national
prohibition of alcoholic beverages.
Attempts at enforcement were costly in money and lives. It
resulted in countless illegal searches and seizures and extensive
confiscation of private property. It was unenforcible as unacceptable to a majority of the people, yet was not repealed for this
reason, but rather to aid in the relieving of a great economic
depression.
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As has been previously stated, and illustrated above, legislation may be too hasty where the legislature is out of harmony with
community values through lack of proper knowledge. Contrarywise legislation may lag for the same reason. This latter situation
seems to exist in the field of accident litigation.

